Time adverbials introduced by until impose restrictions on the aspectual class of the main clause they combine with: they only combine with durative sentences. In negative sentences, the situation is more complex. The question arises whether negative sentences are durative, or whether there is a separate use of until as a negative polarity item. In this paper, I discuss the three treatments of not. . . until that are characterized in the literature as the scope analysis, the ambiguity thesis and the lexical composition approach. I work out the interpretation of the three approaches in an event-based semantics, and argue that they are truth-conditionally equivalent in sentences containing an explicit negation. Furthermore, they generate the same pragmatic implicatures. A separate negative polarity use of until is motivated by sentences containing NPI-licensers different from explicit negation, though. The observation that the scope analysis, the ambiguity thesis and the lexical composition approach are semantically and pragmatically equivalent in sentences containing an explicit negation helps us describe the similarities and differences between the expression of exclusion of a range of values on the rime axis in a variety of languages.
INTRODUCTION

Scope, polarity and lexical composition
In temporal semantics, a distinction is made between durative or atelic sentences (i) and non-durative or telic sentences (2):
(1) a. Susan loves Paul, b. Andrew swam. (2) a. Eve drew a circle.
b. Mary reached the summit. Vendler (1957) provides a more fine-grained classification and distinguishes between states (la) and activities (ib), and accomplishments (2a) and achievements (2b). 1 In this paper I will ignore the distinction between accomplishments and achievements and taken them together as the class of event predicates. Following Bach (1986) , I will use the term 'eventuality' to generalize over states, activities, and events. A number of time adverbials are sensitive to the aspectual character of the sentence they combine with. Among others, this is true for time adverbials and temporal clauses introduced by until. Until only combines with durative sentences containing a state or activity description:
(3) a. Susan wrote until midnight.
b. Susan wrote letters until midnight. c. Susan didn't write a letter until midnight. d. *Susan wrote a letter until midnight.
The fact that negative sentences combine with until has been taken as an argument that negation is an aspectual operator, which yields durative sentences as output. Under this assumption, the contrast between (3c) and (3d) is explained as a difference in aspectual character between non-durative sentences and their durative negative counterpart. Alternatively, it has been suggested that there are two untils: one the well-known durative until and the other a punctual until which only shows up as a negative polarity item (NPI). In this view, (3d) is out because the sentence is not durative, and does not contain an NPI-licenser. Negative polarity items are expressions like any, ever, lift a finger, which only show up in the context of negation, negative quantifiers, ifclauses, comparatives, superlatives, too, and the like (cf. Ladusaw 1979):
(4) a. Susan doesn't have a red cent. b. No one lifted a finger to help me. c. If any of you ever goes to Paris, you should come to visit me. d. This is more money than anyone would have expected to get. e. This is the best movie I have ever seen. f. George is too lazy to do anything.
One of the points of discussion in the interpretation of not.. . until concerns the ambiguity of sentences like (5):
(5) The princess did not sleep until nine o'clock.
On one reading of the sentence, (5) means that the princess did not sleep all the time until nine o'clock (that is, she woke up earlier than nine). Alternatively (5) can be used to claim that there was not a situation of the princess being asleep until nine o'clock (i.e. until nine o'clock, she was awake). On this reading, there is a strong suggestion that the princess fell asleep at or shortly after nine.
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Defenders of the one MnfiV-theory like Smith (1974) and Mittwoch (1977) claim that the ambiguity of sentences like (5) is due to a difference in scope. If negation can take either wide or narrow scope with respect to the wnri/-phrase, the two readings can be represented as in (6) The combination of wide scope negation with durative until in (6a) gives us the interpretation in which it is not the case that the princess slept all the time until nine o'clock, but she woke up earlier. The narrow scope of negation with respect to durative until means that, at least until nine o'clock, it was the case that the princess was not asleep. Karttunen (1974) denies the durative character of negative sentences, and argues against the one WMfiV-theory. He claims that negation always takes wide scope over the until -phrase, so that (6a) is the only correct representation of the logical structure of the sentence. In this view, the different readings of (6) fall out from a lexical ambiguity in the predicate, which correlates with an ambiguity in the MMfi7-phrase. He argues that the verb sleep can have a stative reading under which it means 'be asleep' or an inchoative reading under which it gets the meaning 'fall asleep'. He claims furthermore that the negative polarity use of until is not durative but punctual: it is used to locate events in time. The claim that negative polarity until is not durative but punctual is supported by the combination of until with event predicates in negative sentences such as (3c), but not in affirmative sentences like (3d). Karttunen analyzes punctual until as logically equivalent to before. Thus under the stative reading of the predicate and the regular durative interpretation of until, (5) means that it was not the case that the princess slept until nine o'clock (she woke up earlier). Under the inchoative reading of the predicate and the negative polarity, punctual reading of until, the princess would not begin to sleep before nine (that is, her falling asleep would occur at nine or later).
There is more to the meaning of negative polarity until than its logical equivalence to before. Karttunen notes that the focus is not so much on the absence of an event in the period before a certain point in time (which is what (6b) conveys), but on the fact that the event only happens after a certain point in time. This use of until implies that the event does indeed take place, but that it occurred later than expected. According to Karttunen, (7a) commits the speaker to the truth of both (7b) and (7c):
(7) a. The princess didn't wake up until nine.
b. The princess didn't wake up before nine. c. The princess woke up at nine (or shortly thereafter).
I assume that Karttunen does not take the commitment to (7c) to be part of the assertion, but views it as an implicature. This seems reasonable in view of the fact that the implicature can be cancelled (as in (8a)) or suspended (as in (8b)) (similar examples are in Horn, 1972): 3 (8) a. She said she wouldn't come until Friday. In the end, she didn't come at all. b. I won't leave until Friday, if at all.
The intuition that nine o'clock is somehow late for the princess to wake up is further illustrated in (9) and (10) (Horn 1972 discusses analogous examples):
(9) a. The princess slept until nine at the earliest, b. The princess slept until nine at the latest. (10) a. The princess didn't wake up until nine at the earliest, b. *The princess didn't wake up until nine at the latest.
Intuitively, (9) stretches the duration of the state as long as possible, whereas (10) focusses on the earliest possible moment the situation can hold. In order to capture this feeling of'lateness', Karttunen assumes that negative polarity until t pramatically presupposes that the event occurs before or at t. The rime period beginning at t is then the very last cut of the time stretch during which we would expect the event e to occur, so it happens late. According to Karttunen, neither the intuition that the event is thought of as actually happening, nor the feeling of lateness are captured by the scope analysis. He takes this as additional evidence for his ambiguity approach: it will be part of the lexical meaning of the negative polarity item until. Mittwoch (1977) acknowledges that her scope analysis captures neither the inference that the event actually happens, nor the idea of 'lateness'. However, she argues that this is not crucial, because these meaning effects are implicatures. As such, they are part of the pragmatics of not . .. until, and do not motivate an analysis of negative polarity until as a separate lexical item. As far as the semantics is concerned, Mittwoch claims that there is insufficient evidence in favor of the two Hnfr7s-theory, and that it is enough to havejust one, durative until. A third line of study treats negation as composing directly with the temporal connective. According to Hitzeman (1991) , negation reverses the meaning of until in such a way that 'at all times up to t' gets to mean 'from t onwards'. Although such an analysis can account for examples like (1 ia), it does not work for cases like (lib):
(11) a. The princess did not sleep until nine o'clock.
b. The princess did not wake up until nine o'clock.
It would be incorrect to claim that the princess woke up from nine o'clock onwards in (nb). In order to account for non-durative sentences under negation, Tovena (1995) generalizes the composition approach, and claims that not ... until is a complex operator expressing Allen's (1984) START relation. Under this analysis, nine o'clock marks the start of the waking-up event in (nb). Both proposals underline Karttunen's claim that not... until focusses on the location in time of the event, rather than its absence until then. The feeling of'lateness' is not explained, though. Declerck's (199s) proposal is the best-worked-out version of the lexical composition approach. It accounts for both the focus on the actualization of the event and the idea of lateness by treating not. It is a drawback for both the ambiguity thesis and the lexical composition approach that they have to postulate two untils. As a result, the properties of until in negative sentences have to be stipulated separately, and cannot be derived from its use in affirmative sentences. Thus, these analyses do not observe the principle of compositionality of meaning. However, Karttunen's ambiguity thesis and Declerck's lexical composition approach seem to be able to explain certain aspects of the meaning of not.. . until which are not addressed by the scope analysis. This concerns in particular the implicature that the event actually takes place, and the feeling of 'lateness'. It is hard to evaluate the different proposals at this point, mainly because none of the authors provide a formal analysis of until. The aim of this paper is to make the meaning and use of until and not. . . until precise by providing an explicit interpretation in an event-based temporal semantics. Part of the issue whether aspectual adverbials have a separate use as negative polarity items revolves around the question of the aspectual character of negative sentences. The one until theory makes crucial use of negation as an aspectual operator, whereas Karttunen and others deny that negative sentences are durative. In section 2, I discuss some of the general combinatorial criteria used to determine the aspectual character of sentences. It turns out that data from French provide sufficient evidence to conclude that negative sentences are durative. I argue furthermore that negative sentences are referential in the sense that they introduce a discourse referent which corresponds with the negative state of affairs described by the sentence as a whole.
In section 3,1 develop an analysis of regular durative until in event semantics.
In section 4, I extend the analysis to the semantics of negative sentences involving until, spelling out the scope analysis, the ambiguity thesis and the lexical composition approach in this framework. The conclusion is that for sentences which involve an explicit occurrence of negation, the three analyses are truth-conditionally equivalent. They all interpret not.,. until as defining exclusion on a temporal scale. Section 5 addresses the pragmatics of not ... until. Given certain independently motivated pragmatic assumptions, I argue that even the scope analysis generates the implicature that the event actually arises. Karttunen's intuition that the event occurs 'late' turns out to be related to the interpretation of not. .. until as an expression of scalar exclusion in the temporal domain. All three approaches then generate the same pragmatic implicatures.
Section 6 discusses a number of contexts which potentially allow us to discriminate between the three different treatments of not... until. The scope and polarity analyses develop different, but equivalent representations for sentences expressing exclusion on a temporal scale in German, Dutch, French, and Finnish. The lexicalist approach does not provide insight into the way the complex meaning is built up in different languages. Although Karttunen claims otherwise, the cross-linguistic comparison does not provide evidence in favor of the ambiguity thesis. However, examples of until which do not involve negation or durative contexts, but which occur in contexts which license negative polarity items cannot be explained under either a scope analysis, or a lexical composition approach. I conclude that this provides evidence in favor of a separate use of until as a negative polarity item, and that Karttunen's analysis is justified.
NEGATION AND DURATIVITY
Combinatorial criteria
A number of linguistic tests have been developed to distinguish durative and non-durative sentences. For instance, durative sentences combine with foradverbials, whereas non-durative sentences combine with iM-adverbials, and with the aspectual verb take: If we limit ourselves to these combinatorial tests, we seem to be forced to the conclusion that negative sentences are both durative and non-durative, for they combine wither-and m-adverbials alike, as observed by Krifka (1989) :
(15) a. Jane did not drink (a glass of) wine for two days. b. Jane did not drink (a glass of) wine in two days. c. *It took Jane two days not to drink (a glass of) wine.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that negative sentences do not combine with take, as shown in (15c), which suggests that the criteria used are inconsistent in some sense. There are different ways in which one can try to solve this puzzle. One option is to say that the combinatorial criteria only apply to affirmative sentences and that for and in behave in different ways in negative sentences. This is the position adopted by Vlach (1993) , who argues that the time adverbials in (15) double as negative polarity items. As such, they don't tell us anything about the aspectual character of negative sentences. This is essentially the ambiguity thesis extended to other time adverbials. A good argument in favor of the classification of some expression as a negative polarity item is to show that it is licensed not just by negation, but by certain non-negative expressions which typically license negative polarity items as well. Following this line of argumentation, Vlach (1993) refers to Mittwoch (1988) who points out that^or-and in-adverbials also occur in sentences containing superlatives, and closely related expressions such as thefirst/last/only (cf. Hoeksema 1986):
(16) a. This is the liveliest party I have been to for/in a long time, b. This is the first/only proper meal I have had for/in weeks.
According to Vlach, any attempt to read these sentences with the ordinary durative interpretation of for runs into obvious problems. If we treat the aspectual adverbials in (16) as negative polarity items, there is no reason not to do the same in (15). Vlach concludes that we need not ascribe any aspectual effect to negation. One way to determine the aspectual character of negative sentences without the interference of negarive polarity is to carry out a cross-linguistic study of the combinatorial criteria. This is the approach adopted in de Swart (1995) . One example of a language in which there is no interference between durative time adverbials and negative polarity is French. We observe that durative time adverbials introduced by pendant combine with negative sentences:
(17) pendant -adverbials a. Michele a ete malheureuse pendant des annees. Michele has been unhappy for years. b. Michele a couru pendant trois heures.
Michele has run for three hours. c. # Michele a ecrit une lettre pendant trois heures.
Michele has written a letter for three hours. d. Pendant des annees, Michele n'aima pas le chocolat.
For years Michele didn't like chocolate. e. Pendant trois semaines, Michele n'est pas rentree a la maison.
For three weeks Michele didn't come home.
Negative sentences do not combine with non-durative en -adverbials:
(18) en -adverbials a. # Michele a couru en trois heures. Michele has run in three hours. c. Michele a ecrit une lettre en une demi-heure.
Michele has written a letter in half an hour. d. # Michele n'a pas ete au marche en trois mois.
Michele has not been to the marketplace in three months. e. #Je n'ai pas vu Michele en trois mois.
I haven't seen Michele in three months.
Neither pendant-nor en-adverbials combine with superlatives or other contexts which typically trigger negative polarity items. Compare the sentences in (19) and (20) (from Fauconnier 1980): (19) a. *C'est le premier/seul bon repas que j'aie eu en/pendant trois mois. This is the first/only good meal I have had in/for three months. b. *C'est le meilleur repas que j'aie eu en/pendant trois mois. This is the best meal I have had in/for three months. This present is the most beautiful one has ever given me. b. C'est le seul homme politique qui soit du tout honnete.
It's the only politician who is at all honest.
On the basis of the French data, I conclude that negative sentences are durative. They only combine with non-durative adverbials in languages (such as English) in which these expressions also show up in contexts which license negative polarity items.
Negative states of affairs
The combinatorial criteria distinguish between durative and non-durative sentences. Verkuyl (1993) classifies negative sentences as states. In de Swart (1993), I provide further evidence in favor of this position. One argument is that negative sentences are true at all instants of the interval for which the sentence holds, which is the defining property of states according to Dowty (1979) . One consequence of the position that negative sentences denote negative states of affairs is that I actually claim there is a discourse referent for the negative sentence as a whole. This discourse referent is a state, irrespective of the question whether the sentence embedded under the negation operator refers to a state or an event. In this, I differ from Kamp & Reyle (1993) for instance, who claim that negation is a closing operator, and who interpret negative sentences as the absence of an event, rather than the state of something not happening. Given that this could be argued to be a more conservative approach, my position needs some further motivation.
One argument in favor of the idea that negative sentences introduce their own discourse referent comes from the observation that negative sentences license discourse anaphora. The following examples are provided by Asher (1993) an d Hwang (1992) respectively:
(21) a. John didn't know the answer to the problem. This lasted until the teacher did the solution on the board, b. John did not ask Mary to dance at the party. /( made her angry.
If Hwang and Asher are right that we need some (discourse) entity as the referent for the pronouns this and it, we seem to be committed to this position for both affirmative and negative sentences. However, (21) could still be taken to confirm Asher's view that the negation of an event refers to a fact. An interpretation in terms of facts is not appropriate for sentences like (22), though:
(22) What happened next was that the consulate didn't give us our visa.
Assuming with , Horn (1989: 55) , and others that only events, and not facts, can 'happen', it looks like we have a negative event here, and not simply a fact.
A third argument in favor of the referential character of negative sentences is provided by Stockwell, Schachter, & Partee (1973) , who point out that there are cases where the negation of an event may, loosely speaking, itself be an 'event'. All these sentences allow a reading in which the frequency adverb has scope over negation, meaning that they describe the frequency of a negative situation. According to Stockwell, Schachter, & Partee, sentences like (23) are a counterexample against Lakoff s claim that 'one cannot assert the frequency of an event that does not occur' (Lakoff 1965: 172) . We can add that adverbs of quantification do not quantify over facts, but over eventualities (cf. de Swart, 1991) . Clearly, the kind of examples in (21), (22), and (23) are only felicitous in contexts in which the denial that a certain event took place is informative enough to be stated. This requires something like an unfulfilled expectation or the breaking of a regular pattern. Horn (1989: 201) argues that this is a pragmatic matter: the asymmetry is not located in the relation between propositions (negative vs. affirmative), but in the relation between speech acts (denial vs. assertion). In this perspective, (2i)- (23) show that we gain more insight in the temporal semantic properties of negative sentences when we adopt an analysis in terms of negative state of affairs. 6 The conclusion that negative sentences are durative removes one of Karttunen's objections against the scope analysis. In order to compare the different analyses of not.. . until in more detail, we need to spell out the contribution of until in some version of temporal semantics.
UNTIL IN EVENT SEMANTICS
General notions of event semantics
I adopt a neo-Davidsonian analysis, and assume that all predicates come with an extra event argument. Tenseless clauses are interpreted as denoting sets of eventualities, that is, members of the domain of eventualities e. A verb which has all its argument places filled by either constants or variables provides an atomic eventuality description. Such eventualities are in general conceived of as minimal: the eventuality does not contain anything in addition to what is supported by the predicate-argument structure. The domain £ of eventualities is partially ordered by a part-whole relation C, and a precedence relation < e . There is a join operation U, so that E has the structure of a complete join semilattice.
It is well known in temporal semantics that eventualities come in aspectually different types. In the analysis of until, we need the contrast between durative eventualities (states and activities), and non-durative events. For the purposes of this paper, I do not need to establish an ontological distinction between states and activities, so I will keep them together in the class of durative situations, which I refer to as states. Among the set e of eventualities, there is a subset E of events and a subset S of states, which form complete join semilattices of their own. Every eventuality is either a state or an event, that is e -E u S. An important difference between the two classes of eventualities is that states have divisive reference, that is, parts of the state satisfy the same description as the state as a whole. Events on the other hand have quantized reference: parts of the event do not qualify as the same event. Also, states have cumulative reference, but events do not. That is, any two eventualities can combine to form a third eventuality (Krifka 1989; Lasersohn 1990 ), but the join of two events will not be of the same event type. Whether a sentence introduces a state or an event variable is partly determined by the lexicon (to be rich is a state, to come in is an event), and partly by the semantic character of the arguments of the predicate (to write a letter is an event, to write letters is an activity). In this paper, I will not be concerned with the exact procedure by means of which the aspectual character of atomic predicates is determined (but see Krifka 1989 or Verkuyl 1993 for compositional analyses). I will simply take it for granted that there is such a procedure, which yields either a state or an event variable for every (untensed) sentence.
In order to locate events in time, we need a domain T of times (points or intervals on the time axis), and a precedence relation <, which leads to a total order of T. A function AT from e to T maps eventualities on to their location on the time axis, which Krifka (1989) calls the 'run time' of the eventuality. For an eventuality e to hold at a time t will be written as AT(e, t). Tense operators induce existential closure over the eventuality variable. The past tense introduces the condition t < n which leads to the interpretation that the (minimal) event holds at a time t which precedes the speech time n ('now'). The present tense introduces the condition n Q t. I interpret the future tense as nonpast rather than strictly future, which leads to the condition n < t. All further complexities which arise in the interpretation of tense operators (or aspectual operators such as the Progressive) will be ignored in this paper. Consider (24) under the regular durative interpretation of the predicate:
The untensed sentence introduces a set of states (24a). The tense operator leads to the representation in (24b), which claims that one such state is located at a time preceding the utterance time.
The interpretation of until
Further constraints on the location time t can be provided by locating time adverbials. Just like verbs are treated as predicates of eventualities, temporal nouns such as nine o'clock, Sunday are treated as predicates of times, that is, points or intervals on the time axis. Such clock expressions are part of a cyclic system, and identify times which are separated from each other by a fixed distance on the time axis. Prepositions such as on, before, after, until establish a relation between the event denoted by the main clause and the time denoted by the temporal noun. Until introduces a range of values on the time scale. These are the times t" which precede the time t' referred to by the clock expression d with description Q. In affirmative sentences, (part of) the situation s with description P provided by the (durative) main clause y is claimed to hold at all these times t". The semantics of until is formally defined as follows:
This roughly corresponds with the interpretation of the temporal operator U as defined by Kamp (1968) , but reformulated in an event-based semantics. Following this definition, a sentence like (25) is interpreted as in (25a):
(25 a) spells out the intuition that there is a situation of the princess being asleep which holds at some time t'" in the past which includes a time t. Furthermore, there is a time t' of nine o'clock, and at every time t" preceding t' and going all the way back to (, it is the case that the princess slept. 7 Universal quantification over times preceding the time of the adverbial guarantees a durative interpretation of the main clause. Remember that states and activities, but not events have divisive reference. Thus it is possible for states and activities to have a part of the situation which satisfies the same description to hold at all times preceding the time of the time adverbial. For events this is impossible.
(Minimal) events only hold at the interval as a whole, and part of the event does not satisfy the same event description. This correctly rules out such ungrammatical sentences as (26): (26) a. *Susan wrote a letter until midnight. b. "The princess woke up until nine o'clock (25a) shows that until introduces existential quantification over the time t' of nine o'clock. As far as clock adverbials are concerned this seems an uncontroversial assumption: there will always be a time of nine o'clock. As soon as we study temporal clauses introduced by until, the claim of existence does not always hold, which will lead to a modification of the analysis. This issue will be taken up in section 5.2 below. Note that the use of a clock expression like nine o'clock normally selects the time of nine o'clock nearest to the speech time or reference time. A condition which guarantees that the nearest time is selected can easily be added, but for the sake of transparency of the definition I will not make this requirement explicit. Of course the princess did not sleep at all times going back to the beginning of the earth. In (25a) there is a beginning point t for the interval we take into consideration, which Kamp & Reyle (1993: 634) suggest could have been made explicit with a^rom-phrase as in (27): (27) The princess slept from midnight until nine o'clock.
In (25), the beginning point of the interval is not explicitly defined. It is contextually given, and I assume that there are appropriate implicit restrictions on the domain of quantification which handle this. In the case of the future tense, t is often (but not always) identified with the speech time. The only restriction I impose on t is that t is chosen somewhere in the run time of the situation of the princess being asleep, so that (part of) the state occurs at the beginning point of the interval we are interested in. Although t and t' are the beginning point and the endpoint of the interval taken into consideration, I do not make the claim that the state s of the princess being asleep did not start earlier or continue later. If this is inferred from the sentence, it is an implicature (Grice 1975) , not an assertion. The fact that the speaker explicitly defines the boundary of the interval suggests that she knows until which time the state lasted. If she knew that it lasted longer, by the principle of cooperative conversation and the maxim of quantity, she should have said so. Stating that the princess slept until nine o'clock then implicates that she did not sleep any longer.
4 THE SEMANTICS OF NOT . . . UNTIL
The definition of durative until provides the starring point for a more detailed discussion of the meaning of not... until. I will first spell out how a scope analysis can be formulated in the event-based framework I have adopted, and then do the same for the ambiguity thesis and the lexical composition approach.
The scope analysis
As pointed out in section 1, Smith and Mittwoch assume that the ambiguity of a sentence like (28) is due to the fact that negation can take either wide (28a) or narrow (28b) scope with respect to until. The interpretation of the wide scope reading of negation is worked out in (29): (29) The princess did not sleep until nine o'clock a. It is not the case that the princess slept until nine o'clock.
(She woke up earlier, e.g. at seven.)
is the negation of (25a). 9 As usual, the negation of a conjunction comes out true as soon as one of the conjuncts is false. In principle, then, there is a series of possible situations which can make (29b) true. One of them is to assume that there is a (nearest) time of nine o'clock and that the princess slept at some point in time in the past, but to deny that the situation lasted until nine o'clock. This possibility is spelled out in (29c). Note that (29b) and (29c) are not equivalent. Strictly speaking, there is not even an entailment relation between them. (29c) comes out true and (29b) false in case there is a situation of the princess sleeping which didn't last from t until nine o'clock, but there is at least one other situation of the princess sleeping which did last from t until nine o'clock. This can only be true if a situation of the princess being asleep can be included in another situation of the princess sleeping without being considered part of that situation. The question of identity of events, and the distinction between two eventualities sharing the same descriptive content, and overlapping partly or completely in their location time raises important problems in event semantics. Although I will not commit myself to the claim that there never are two cotemporal but different eventualities which satisfy the same description, I will assume that this is normally not the case. Modulo this assumption about 'normal' event structures, (29c) entails (29b). Two clearcut contexts in which (29b) comes out true and (29c) comes out false are situations in which there is no (nearest) time of nine o'clock or there is no state of the princess being asleep at some point in time in the past which includes t. Unless the sentence is used to express a meta-linguistic negation in the sense of Horn (1989) , these cases are not relevant contexts with respect to which we want to evaluate our sentence, though. As we observed above, it is natural to assume that there will always be a (nearest) time of nine o'clock, independently of what happens at that time. Independently motivated assumptions about the characterization of the time axis then rule out the possibihty of falsifying that conjunct, and it is de facto outside the scope of negation. If the speaker wanted to deny that a situation of die princess sleeping ever occurred, it would make much more sense to use a sentence like (30) than (29): (30) The princess didn't (ever) sleep.
The Gricean Maxim of Manner saying 'be brief requires the speaker to choose the less complex one out of two, equally informative expressions. If the speaker adds a time adverbial in (29), and wants the time adverbial under the scope of negation, this should be relevant. Because of the existence of a straightforward alternative (namely (30)), it is most relevant when the situation denoted by the main clause occurs, but does not satisfy the relation denoted by the temporal connective. This leads to the interpretation in (29c), which correctly reflects the intuition that the princess woke up earlier than at nine.
Smith and Mittwoch's claim that the other reading of (29) corresponds with a narrow scope interpretation for negation requires us first to interpret event negation in our framework. In section 2.2 above, I defended the view that negative sentences introduce their own discourse referent, and describe a state which corresponds with a negative state of affairs. We can establish a natural relation between a negative state of affairs and the state or event it is the negation of by following Krifka's (1989) proposal to interpret negative eventualities as the 'fusion' of all eventualities at a given time t which are not of the type of 'the princess being asleep'. In a lattice-theoretical framework, maximal eventualities are interpreted as the sum of all events at some point in time. My definition of maximal eventuality in (31) is based on Krifka's:
Here sup e is the supremum in the join semila trice of eventualities £, which gives us the sum of all eventualities e' occurring at some time t' included in t. Negative eventualities refer to maximal eventualities which do not satisfy the eventuality description at a given time /. Following Krifka again, we define event predicate negation as in (32):
Negation is thus a modifier which operates on an eventuality description P and yields the maximal state s such that no eventuality e of type P is contained in s. For the reading of (3 3) with narrow scope for negation, this view leads to the paraphrase in (33a) and the representation in (33b):
(3 3) The princess did not sleep until nine o'clock a. A situation in which the princess did not sleep lasted until nine o'clock.
(33b) claims that at some point in time in the past, it was the case that the princess did not sleep, and for all times until nine o'clock, it was the case that there was a situation of the princess not sleeping holding at that time. Negation now just affects the main clause. In this interpretation, we crucially rely on the negative sentence denoting a durative situation. In Mittwoch's view, it is the durative nature of negative sentences which allows them to combine with until.
In the event semantics adopted here, Mittwoch's claim is reflected in the assumption that there is a state of affairs corresponding with the negation of the princess being asleep. The discourse referent introduced outside the scope of negation is a state variable, whether the predicate embedded under the negation operator is an event predicate or a state predicate. Once we have the state of affairs corresponding with the princess not being asleep, we can use the regular durative interpretation of until which requires a part of that situation to hold at all times up until nine o'clock as in (33b). Following Krifka's interpretation of event negation, (33b) is equivalent to (33c): the period of time during which the situation of the princess not being asleep lasts includes no situation of the princess being asleep. (33c) can be further reduced to (33d). It is easy to see that (33c) entails (33d). But (33d) entails (33c) as well: if there is no situation of the princess being asleep between t and t' (as claimed by (33d)), there is an interval t'" which includes the period of rime from t to t' at which no situation of the princess being asleep holds ( -c). This in turn allows us to define the (maximal) negative state of affairs of the princess not being asleep as holding at t'" (= b). The formulas in (33b), (c) and (d) are thus equivalent. As far as the scope analysis is concerned, both readings of the sentence 'The princess did not sleep until nine o'clock' involve a durative time adverbial. Even so, the formulas in (29c) and (3 3d) are not equivalent. The first one has negation taking wide scope over the universal quantifier associated with until, the second one has negation taking narrow scope with respect to the universal quantifier. So we end up with two logically distinct readings, and the sentence is truly ambiguous. Sentences which involve an event predicate are not ambiguous. Unless it triggers the phenomenon of implied durativity discussed in section 6.3 below, the event predicate is incompatible with the durative time adverbial, so a wide scope interpretation of negation over the wnf//-phrase is excluded. The interpretation of negation as an aspectual operator allows a narow scope interpretation of negation, though. This leads to the interpretation of (34) spelled out in (343-d):
(34) The princess did not wake up until nine o'clock. a. A situation in which the princess did not wake up lasted until nine o'clock. e) A AT(e, t"")
This interpretation of (34) excludes an event of the princess waking up in the time interval from t to ('.
The ambiguity thesis
Under the ambiguity thesis, the correct semantic representation of (35) is as in (35a), with wide scope of negation over the until -phrase:
The ambiguity of (35) is due to an ambiguity in the predicate sleep and in the connective until. Given that Karttunen recognizes the negation of durative until as one of the readings of the sentence, we can work out this interpretation of (35) exactly as in (29) above. I take it that Karttunen and Smith/Mittwoch agree on the interpretation of this reading of (35). According to Karttunen, the other interpretation of (35) arises from a negative polarity, punctual until. He claims that in this use, until is logically equivalent to before. I will interpret before as involving existential quantification over times t preceding the time t' denoted by the time adverbial. The semantics of before is formally defined as follows: 10
• For y. ke[P(e) A 3t AT(e, ()] and 6: X(Q(t'):
In most uses of before, the event cannot happen at just any time before the time specified by the adverbial, but it has to happen in the vicinity of that time. This is captured by introducing a contextually given interval of time between t and t' witliin which the event is expected to take place. For a sentence like (36), this definition of before leads to the interpretation in (36a):
(36) Jane left before nine o'clock a. 3e3r3f 3f"[Leave(j, e) A AT(e, t") A Nine(f') A t< t" < t'\ 
AT(e, t") A t < t" < t']]
(37b) gives negation wide scope over the sentence as a whole, but unless the sentence is used to express a meta-linguistic negation, the pragmatic scope of negation will be narrower than that. If we assume that there is always a nearest time of nine o'clock, we can move this condition outside the scope of negation (37c). The Maxim of Manner favors the shorter over the longer expression, so it only makes sense to utter the sentence with a wide scope reading of negation over the time adverbial if the main clause event itself is presupposed to happen. This interpretation is spelled out in (37d), which best captures Karttunen's intuition about negative polarity until: it claims that the princess fell asleep, but that this did not happen before nine o'clock. It must thus have happened at nine or some time after. Although both the durative and the polarity interpretations of until in (29) and (37) involve a wide scope interpretation for negation as desired, the formulas in (29c) and (37c!) are clearly not equivalent. The former involves the negation of a universal quantifier over times preceding nine o'clock, and the latter the negation of an existential quantifier over times preceding nine o'clock. The formulas in (29) and (37) thus correctly reflect the ambiguity of the sentence. From these interpretations it follows that sentences involving nonstarive predicates are not ambiguous. After all, the kind of interpretation in (29) crucially relies on the interpretation of until as a durative time adverbial. Given that event predicates do not combine with durative time adverbials in general, they will only give rise to the kind of interpretation sketched in (37). An example is worked out in (38):
(38) The princess did not wake up until nine o'clock.
a. The princess did not wake up before nine o'clock. b. 3t-3e3f'3r[Wake-up(princess,e) A AT(e, r") A Nine(f') A
The negative polarity interpretation of until claims that there is an event of the princess waking up, but it did not occur before nine o'clock (38*!). The question is now how the two interpretations given in (33) and (37), and (34) and (38) are related. It is easy to see that (34d) and (38c) are equivalent, because there is no difference in truth conditions between the wide scope of a universal quantifier over negation, and the narrow scope of an existential quantifier with respect to negation. The relation between stative sentences involving not. .. until in the two theories is a bit harder to establish. Karttunen and Smith/Mi ttwoch agree on the first interpretation of'The princess did not sleep until nine o'clock', which presupposes that the situation occurred, and asserts that it did not last until nine o'clock (29). There are two problems in comparing the other reading of the sentence. The first one is that Karttunen denies that negative sentences denote states, but we can solve that by using (33c) or (d) rather than (33b) for comparison. The second problem is that Mittwoch does not interpret sleep as an event predicate. So in order to establish a comparison, we need to determine the relation between falling asleep and being asleep. If we interpret falling asleep as starring to be asleep, we can argue that every event of falling asleep is immediately followed by a state of being asleep. This inference is an instantiation of the following pattern:° General relation between 'start to be ADJ' and 'be ADJ':
The symbol DC is introduced by Kamp & Reyle (1993) to describe an 'abut' relation. It captures the intuition that the state of being ADJ holds at a time /' adjacent to the time t at which the event of starring to be ADJ occurs. A related claim is that, for all states which do have a beginning point, the (maximal) state of being ADJ at some time has a starting-to-be-ADJ event at its initial border. This is formulated as the following inference:° General relation between 'be ADJ and 'start to be ADJ':
This last inference pattern is sufficient to guarantee that (33d) entails (37c):
(39) shows that the narrow scope interpretation of negation entails the negative polarity interpretation. The implication in the other direction is not logically valid. The crucial counterexample is given by a situation in which there is no event of the princess falling asleep in the interval from t to t', but it is nevertheless false that the princess is not asleep, because the princess fell asleep before t. She cannot fall asleep again in the period from t to ( if she is already asleep at ( and continues to asleep until at least t'. However, this is intuitively not a relevant context with respect to which we want to compare the two analyses. I will make the pragmatic assumption that the statement that no event of the princess fell asleep during an interval is only relevant in a context in which the princess is not already asleep. Modulo this assumption, (37c) implies (33d), so the scope analysis and the ambiguity thesis are equivalent.
4.3
The lexical composition approach Declerck (1995) argues that not ... until is a sterotyped unit which has the meaning of 'only', and is lexicalized in other languages by means of a simple lexical item. Karttunen (1974) points out that a sentence like (40a) translates with the positive polarity item erst in German (40b). The Dutch particle pas is similar in use (40c):
(40) a. The princess didn't wake up until nine o'clock. b. Die Prinzessin wachte erst um neun Uhr auf. c. De prinses werd pas om negen uur wakker. Konig (1991: 38 and further) argues that erst is an exclusive focus particle akin to nur, which is the most straightforward translation of only. Both erst and nur imply that the contextually given alternatives (the C-set in Rooth's 1992 terminology) do not satisfy the open sentence in their scope. The main difference is that nur selects its alternatives from an unordered set, while erst is sensitive to the scale on which the alternatives are ordered. Konig illustrates the contrast between nur and erst with the minimal pair in (41) Nur in (41a) excludes any days before or after the day mentioned, if these days happen to be under consideration in the context. Erst in (41b) only excludes days preceding the one denoted by the focus constituent, for it selects alternative values that are lower on the scale than the focus value. As a consequence, (41 b) cannot be used if the speaker wants explicitly to exclude the Fri-day or Saturday of a certain week. Within the event semantics developed in this paper, we can represent (41a) and (b) as in (42) and (43) Both (42) and (43) appeal to a contextually determined set C of possible days at which I could have gone to Munich. This set needs to include at least one contextually relevant alternative time in addition to Thursday. For nur, C is just an unordered set. In (42), we can assume that C contains the days of the week. For a scalar particle like erst, the set of contextually relevant alternatives is ordered on a scale, which I interpret as a partially ordered set. Such a set of alternatives will be written as C po . In (43) the relevant order is provided by the time axis, so the partial order on the set of days is just temporal precedence. Erst excludes all values which are lower on the scale than Thursday (43a). In other words, no event of going to Munich occurs on any day of the week earlier than Thursday (43 b). Furthermore, exclusive particles are usually taken to be presuppositional. If the fact that I went to Munich is assumed to happen, as in (43c), we can easily explain the implicature that it will happen on Thursday or shortly after from the exclusive character of erst,, u Unlike (42), (43) does not exclude the possibility that I also go to Munich on Saturday. Because Saturday is not lower on the scale (-earlier in time) than Thursday, and it is not part of the range of values that are explicitly excluded, my going to Munich on Saturday is not incompatible with the truth of (43). Typically, erst identifies values rather high on the scale, because this creates a pragmatically relevant set of alternatives. Thus (43) could be felicitously uttered on a Sunday, but not really on Wednesday night, because in the latter context there is no relevant alternative earlier than Thursday. It is a result of the scalar nature of the particle that (43), but not (42) gives the hearer the feeling that Thursday is rather late for a visit to Munich.
In order to establish a comparison between the lexical composition approach and the two analyses developed above, we can spell out the interpretation (44a) gets under the view that not... until is equivalent to erst in (44b) as in (44c). The identification of the scale with the time axis leads to the interpretation in (44d) Remember that the scope analysis claims that the situation of the princess not waking up lasts until nine. The negative polarity analysis claims that there is no situation of the princess waking up before nine. The interpretation of not. . . until as an exclusive scalar particle locates the first possible situation of the princess waking up at nine or later. The formulas in (34d), (38c), and (44d) are different but logically equivalent, so the three different approaches yield the same truth conditions. The results for starive sentences are similar. The first conclusion of this paper is then that, if one accepts the way the three approaches are spelled out in the event semantics developed here, there are no semantic differences between the scope analysis, the ambiguity thesis, and the lexical composition approach: they all interpret not. ., until as expressing exclusion of a range of values on the time axis. If there are differences between the three approaches, then they must reside in the way they describe the pragmatics of this construction. Karttunen (1974) points out that a sentence like (45) strongly suggests that the event of waking up actually occurs:
THE PRAGMATICS OF NOT . . . UNTIL
Actualization of the event
(45) The princess did not wake up until nine o'clock.
Karttunen accounts for this observation by assuming that negative polarity until comes with the pragmatic presupposition that the event occurs before t or at t. The negation excludes the possibility that the event occurs before t, so this induces the feeling that the princess wakes up at nine in (45 
. 3s3Bt'3t"'[bAAX(s) A (-Wake-up)(princess,s) A AT(s, t"')
The Gricean principle of cooperative discourse requires the speaker to be maximally informative. If the speaker asserts that the situation of the princess not waking up lasts until nine o'clock, this generates the implicature that the situation did not last beyond nine o'clock. Now, the normal way in which a situation of the princess not waking up ends is for the princess to wake up. This is an instantiation of a general relation between a state of affairs defined as the negation of an event and the event it is the negation of:
For all predicates P and all arguments x,... x n and event variables e such that P(x,... x n , e) describes an event, it is that case that: Vx,... x.ViVWVr [[(-.P)(x,...
x n , 5) A MAX(i) A AT(i, ()A('C t A t' < t" A -3s'[s' CsA (-P)(x, ...x n , s') A AT(s', (")]] -3e3t'"[P(x 1 ... x n , e) A (, t'") At'< t'"j< t"]]
• Using the general observation that the negative state of affairs ends with the event happening, and the implicature of until that the situation does not last beyond the time it is asserted of, I claim that, in the narrow scope interpretation of negation, (46) implicates that the princess woke up at or shortly after nine o'clock. According to Declerck (1995: 69) such a pragmatic inference is not strong enough to account for the feeling that the event actually occurs. His main argument is that a conversational implicature cannot explain the difference between affirmative and negative sentences involving until.
Consider (47) and (48):
(47) a. Nancy remained a spinster until 1978. b. Nancy didn't get married until 1978. (48) a. Nancy remained a spinster until she died, b. Nancy didn't get married until she died.
Both (47a) and (47b) suggest that Nancy got married in 1978. According to Declerck, the implicature in the first sentence is weaker than in the second one, though. He illustrates this with the pair of sentences in (48). (48a) does not suggest that Nancy got married. (48b), on the other hand, still has the sense of actualization, and it is semantically anomalous because of this. Declerck concludes that the scope analysis does not offer a satisfactory explanation of the implicature of actualization. I do not think this conclusion follows from the data in (47) and (48). Note that the implicature we expect on the basis of our interpretation of regular durative until is that the situation ends at or shortly after the time given by the time adverbial. Which way the situation ends is of course dependent on the context. For (47a), the end of the situation of Nancy remaining a spinster is most naturally induced by marriage. However, in (48a), the situation ends with her death. After Nancy dies, she is no longer a spinster, because this concept simply does not apply to dead people. (47b) and (48b) are different. We just observed that the end of a state of affairs consisting of the negation of an event predicate is the occurrence of the event in question. In (47b) this gives rise to the implicature that Nancy did indeed get married. The situation of not getting married does not end at Nancy's death in (48b): after she dies, she is still not getting married. The implicature that the event actually occurs is infelicitous in this context, and therefore the sentence is pragmatically anomalous. However, Declerck's statement that the implicature is stronger than what can be calculated on the basis of the conversational principles has some intuitive appeal. One way to preserve the scope analysis, but make the implicature stronger, is to assume that the inference has been conventionalized and is short-circuited in the sense of Horn (1989) . It is well known from the study of indirect requests that a given pragmatic inferencing mechanism may apply more directly to one expression than to another. For instance, 'Can you pass me the salt?' is conventionally used to request the salt, but 'Are you able to pass me the salt?' is not. As pointed out by Morgan (1978) , the conventional usage of such indirect requests does not make it necessary to treat them as idioms. Along these lines, it is straightforward to assume that in the case of not ... until, the implicature that the event actually happens is short-circuited, rather than calculated for every instance. The degree to which the implicature is conventionalized depends on the relation between the main and the subordinate clause. Sometimes this relation is purely temporal (49a), but in many cases it is causal in nature. Bree (1985) observes that in general the untilclause can be the cause of the ending of the main clause situation (49b), the result of the activity described by the main clause (49c) or the goal for which the main clause activity is carried out (49d):
(49) a. It will simply delay the debate until the qualifications are closed next spring.
b. This cooling ... just delays the natural softening of the fruit until a grovelike temperature is restored. c. And from that the stock moved right on up until it was trading Thursday morning at around 22 a share. d. Extend your feet forward and backward until you are in a deep leg split.
According to Bree, the implicature that the situation changes after the time indicated can only be cancelled if the wnfiV-clause indicates the result or the goal of the main clause activity. Bree also points out that there are no negative main clauses with result or goal interpretations in his corpus. If result and goal interpretations are systematically missing for negative sentences, this may explain why negative main clauses always observe the conventionalized conversational implicature that the M«(;7-clause marks the change in truth value of the main clause. Interestingly, this goes one step in the direction of Declerck's lexical composition approach, without postulating a full lexicalization process.
More on (non)-actualization
Some interesting further questions concerning the interpretation of until arise when we take a closer look at (full) temporal clauses, rather than time adverbials. As observed above, it makes sense to introduce existential quantification over the time denoted by the time adverbial in (50) as in (50a), because we can safely assume that such a time exists:
(50) The princess slept until nine o'clock.
We can extend this analysis to temporal clauses, and build in existential quantification over the event denoted by the wnri/-clause. For examples like (51) this would be an uncontroversial assumption:
(51) The princess slept until the prince kissed her.
In (51) the event of the prince kissing the princess is taken to be factual, and the situation of the princess sleeping lasts until the time of that event. But other cases are more complex. Compare an example like (52):
(52) Anne will keep her job until she finds a better one.
(52) is compatible with a situation in which Anne has ajob now, and never quits her job, simply because she may never find a better one. Clearly then, we do not want existential quantification over the event of Anne finding a better job in the future. This situation is reminiscent of the problems which arise in the interpretation of non-veridical before, pointed out by Anscombe (1964) and Henamaki (1978) . Consider an example like (53):
(53) They left the country before anything happened.
We can accept the sentence as a whole to be true without being forced to accept the truth of the before -clause. That is, whether something actually happens or not is irrelevant for the truth of (53). An even stronger case arises in (54), where the before -clause describes an event which did not take place:
(54) Anne died before she completed the novel.
We cannot infer from (54) that there is a time at which Anne completed the novel. The use of before in examples like (54) is called 'non-factual', because the event never materialized. The use of before in examples like (53) is called 'nonveridical', because the truth of the sentence as a whole is compatible with the subordinate clause being false (without this being necessarily the case). In both cases, a translation in terms of existential quantification is not warranted, because the event described by the before -clause has not or need not have taken place. Landman's (1991) solution is to replace the existential quantifier with a universal one. This leads to a generalization of the interpretation of before:°
For main clause y: ke\P{e) A 3t AT(e, t)] and subordinate clause d: MQ(e') A 3t'AT{e\ t')}: ||before(y, <5)| | -ke3Bt"[P(e) A AT(e, t) A Ve'[[Q(e') A 3f AT(c', t')] -t" < t< t']]
This definition generalizes over both non-veridical and non-actual uses of before. For instance, it allows us to translate (54) as in (55) This correctly allows Anne to die without her ever finishing the novel. The change from an existential to a universal quantifier correlates with a more general difference in status beween main clauses and subordinate clauses introduced by a temporal connective, which was already observed by Heinamaki (1978) . Main clause events are asserted, which explains the existential quantification over the event of Anne dying. Subordinate clauses however, are presuppositional. As a consequence, existential quantification is not entailed, but only implicated. It is a general characteristic of presuppositions that they can be cancelled. 
The generalized definition of until allows us to interpret ($2) as in (56): 13 (56) Anne will keep her job until she finds a better one.
(56a) asserts that Anne has a job that she keeps at some (non-past) time t. t includes a contextually determined time (', which, in the absence of a further specification is probably interpreted as referring to the speech time. Furthermore, (56a) claims that for all future times at which she has not yet found a better job, Anne will keep her old job. In other words, she keeps her job as long as she does not find a better one. This clearly allows Anne to keep her job for ever if she never finds a better one. The modus tollens version of (56a) in (56b) shows even more clearly that finding a better job is a necessary condition for Anne no longer to keep her old job, because it spells out the intuition that Anne only stops keeping her job if she finds a better one.
The combination of the generalized definition ofuntil with the behaviour of event predicates under negation sheds some light on Karttunen's observation that not... until focusses on the onset of the event denoted by the main clause, rather than on its absence until the time denoted by the subordinate clause. Consider an example like (57): (57) Anne will not quit her job until she finds a better one. In Karttunen's view, a sentence like (57) focusses on Anne quitting her job when she finds a better one. Using the generalized definition of until, we can interpret (58) as in (58a): (58) Anne will not quit her job until she finds a better one.
AT(e\ *"')]] -3e3t"[¥md(a, e) A AT(e, t") A f < t" < ('"]]]
(58a) tells us that there is a time t at which the state holds that Anne does not quit her job. The time t' included in t at which we start evaluating the situation may be identified with the speech time. We further claim that at any future time at which Anne does not find a better job, she will not yet have quit. This is equivalent with (58b), which states that Anne will only be out of the state of not quitting her job when or after she finds a better one. The only way for Anne to end the state of not quitting her job is to participate in an event of quitting her job. As observed in section 5.1 above, there is a general constraint on the relation between the state of affairs which describes the negation of an event, which requires that for that state of affairs to end there must be an event of the type of the predicate taking place. Using this constraint, we can immediately derive (58c) from (58b). Finding a better job is then a necessary condition for Anne to quit her job. The interesting observation to make here is that the sentence does not focus so much on the state of not-quitting as on the location of a possible event of quitting as happening only at or after the time Anne finds a better job. This is especially clear from (58c), and it fits in with Karttunen's observations that not... until is punctual in this use, and is typically used to locate events in time. Clearly, the kind of examples in (58) can also be handled in an analysis which interprets until as 'before'. However, the translation in (58) shows that it is not necessary to give a special negative polarity interpretation of until, or to build the focus on the onset of the event as a special requirement into the semantics of not ... until (as in Tovena 1995 or Declerck 1995 . It is the generalized interpretation of until in combination with the behavior of event predicates under negation which is responsible for the meaning effects observed in relation to (58). Note moreover that the sentence focusses on the possible event of quitting in relation to finding a better job, and does not in any sense imply or implicate that this will actually happen. The examples discussed here thus argue against Declerck's strong views of actualization as an assertion. More evidence in favour of the generalized definition of until is provided by sentences involving quantified NPs, as in (59): (59) Everyone,-keeps her,-job until she,-finds a better one.
Clearly, the universal quantifier over individuals has wide scope over the proposition as a whole. This is what allows it to bind a variable in the until-clause. Of course we do not assert that everyone has a job she keeps. But we do claim for everyone who has a job at some point in time that they will hang on to it as long as they don't find a better one. This is spelled out in (59a). For some people it may come true that they find a better job, for others it may never occur. Either way, it is true that finding a better job is a necessary condition for no longer keeping one's job (59b).
The most obvious choice for t' in (56) and (58) is the speech time, but this does not carry over to the quantificational context in (59). Clearly, we want to leave open the possibility that people hold jobs at different points in time. This is reflected in the universal quantifier over t' in (59a) and (b). For any such time t', though, it is true that the times t'" following t' will also be times at which the person holds the job, unless they find a better job at some time t" preceding or equal to (". Similar examples can be constructed with negative universal quantifiers, as in (60): (60) No one,-quits her,-job until she,-finds a better one.
This sentence claims that people don't quit their jobs as long as they do not find a better one (60a, b). In other words, they only quit their jobs if they find a better one. The fact that finding a better job is a necessary condition for quitting is perhaps most transparent from (6o)c.
Lateness
So far, we have concentrated our discussion of the pragmatics of not. ., until on Karttunen's (1974) observation that the focus is not so much on the absence of an event in the period before a certain point in time, but on the fact that the event only happens after a certain point in time. This use of until implies that the event does indeed take place, but that it occurred later than expected. The intuition of'lateness' is illustrated in (9) and (10), repeated here as (61) and (62): (61) a. *The princess slept until nine at the earliest, b. The princess slept until nine at the latest. (62) a. The princess didn't wake up until nine at the earliest, b. The princess didn't wake up until nine at the latest.
Intuitively, (61) stretches the duration of the state as long as possible, whereas (62) focusses on the earliest possible moment the situation can hold. In order to capture this effect of lateness, Karttunen assumes that negative polarity until t pragmatically presupposes that the event occurs before t or at t. The idea is that the time period beginning at / is the very last cut of the time stretch during which we would expect the event e to occur. In the present framework, we can reanalyze this pragmatic presupposition as an instance of a more general phenomenon. The conclusion of section 4 was that the scope analysis, the ambiguity thesis and the lexical composition approach are semantically equivalent; they all interpret not... until as expressing exclusion on a temporal scale. We observed that scalar focus particles such as German erst and Dutch pas typically identify a value high on the scale, because this creates a pragmatically relevant set of alternatives for which the predication is excluded. Consider the following Dutch example:
(63) a. Hij komt pas als je hem minstens honderd dollar geeft.
He will only come if you give him at least a hundred dollars, b. ??Hij komt pas als je hem hoogstens honderd dollar geeft.
He will only come if you give him at most a hundred dollars.
At least a hundred dollars identifies the lowest point on the scale which is sufficient to make him come, and the scalar focus particle is infelicitous with an expression such as at most a hundred dollars which identifies a maximum, rather than a minimum value on the scale.
14 Given that the effect is related to the choice of values on a scale, rather than the character of the scale, it need not surprise us that temporal examples can be found as well, for instance: (64) a. Ik kom pas om tien uur thuis, op z'n vroegst.
I will only come home at ten o'clock at the earliest, b. ??Ik kom pas om tien uur thuis, op z'n laatst.
I will only come home at ten o'clock, at the latest.
If pas excludes everything below a certain lowest value on the time scale, it is incompatible with a specification such as at the latest, which refers to the highest value on the scale. I propose to extend this argumentation to exclusive constructions where the scalar character comes from other sources than an explicit particle like erst or pas. In the case of not... until the scalar character of the construction comes from the temporal connective: the time axis is just one example of a scale. A sentence like (65) presupposes that the princess woke up, and asserts that this did not happen at any time earlier than nine o'clock It is the fact that nine o'clock is somewhere high on the temporal scale which suggests that we have to wait all this time for the event to happen. Thus the princess woke up late. If the use of until in negative sentences excludes everything below a certain lowest value on the time scale, it is incompatible with a specification such as at the latest, which refers to the highest value in the context. This explains the felicity patterns in (61) and (62) above in ways similar to the ones in (63) and (64). Thus the effect of lateness which Kartunnen observed arises from the scalar interpretation, rather than from anything particular about the negative polarity status of until, and it can be accounted for by the scope analysis and the lexical composition approach as well.
Now that we have also accounted for the factor of lateness, we can conclude that there are no semantic or pragmatic differences between the interpretation of not. .. until in terms of scope, the one which postulates a separate use of until as a negative polarity item, and the lexical composition approach. The question arises at this point: is there any context in which we can determine which analysis is the right one, or are they all equally good? This issue is addressed in the next section. Declerck (1995) treats not. . . until as a stereotyped unit with the meaning of a scalar exclusive particle akin to erst in German or pas in Dutch. His lexical composition approach suggests that the semantics and pragmatics of the stereotyped and the lexical unit are the same. This is not quite true. In the section on lateness, we already discussed examples which show that the use of erst and pas as scalar exclusive particles is not limited to temporal contexts. Konig (1991: 114) provides the following example of a non-temporal scale:
EXCLUSION AND SCALES ACROSS LANGUAGES
Problems for the lexical composition approach
(66) Erst ein Mercedes wiirde ihn zufriedenstellen.
Only (nothing less than) a Mercedes would satisfy him.
The fact that nothing lower on the scale is good enough conveys the idea that the person has very high demands. As a consequence, it is pragmatically odd to utter a sentence like (67) 
(71a) claims that all contextually determined alternatives for x are identified with John. In (71b), we exclude all values different from John. The two statements are equivalent, and they both come with the presupposition that John actually came. As a further argument in favor of the view that the use of until in negative contexts is indeed conventionalized I would like to draw attention to a language like French. In French, we do not even use a temporal connective, but translate (72a) with the general discontinuous exclusive construction in (72b): (72) (72b) has a scalar reading in which the princess did not wake up any earlier than nine o'clock. But the scalar character of the exclusion comes from the (temporal) context, and it is not part of the semantics of the construction. In other words, the semantics of ne... que is like the one of nur, rather than erst. The interpretation of (72b) can then be spelled out as in (74) 3e'3t'3t"3t'"[Nine o'clock(f') A Wake-up(princess,/) A AT(e', t'") Â
3e3t[t" < t< t' A Wake up(princess, e) A AT(e, t) A -[to t']]]
The fact that the focus particle associates with a time adverbial determines the temporal character of the set of alternatives. This allows for (74a) in principle to get the reading in which the time the princess woke up is nine o'clock, not any other time on the time axis. In this context, however, the scalar interpretation of ne... que is strongly preferred. So C is set to the interval preceding nine o'clock, and the beginning of the interval is given by a contextually determined time t" (74b). The exclusive focus construction induces the presupposition that the event actually occurs. If we add this information, we end up with the formula in (74c). (74c) claims that there is an event of the princess waking up, but it does not occur before nine o'clock. Therefore, it must occur at nine or later. This is equivalent to the interpretation developed for the English and German/Dutch counterparts of this sentence. Languages thus use different means to express exclusion on a temporal scale. French uses a negative exclusive focus construction, where both the scalar interpretation and the temporal character of the scale come from the context. In German and Dutch, the dominant construction involves the use of an exclusive scalar focus particle, which leaves it to the time adverbial it associates with to provide the temporal character of the scale. Finally, in the English not . . . until construction, we find that the temporal scale is given by the connective, and the interaction with negation gives the construction an exclusive reading. Declerck's lexical composition approach is not fine-grained enough to capture the similarities and differences among the various constructions languages use.
'Before'and'until'
One argument Karttunen (1974) advances in favor of his approach is crosslinguistic in nature. According to Karttunen, Finnish is of special interest, because he claims it has a lexical item ennen kuin which corresponds to negative polarity until. What I found is that ennen kuin means before rather than until. The fact that ennen kuin is felicitous in an affirmative sentence like (75), which contains no NPI-licenser, suggests that it is not a negative polarity item:
(75) Ennen kuin menen pitemmalle, selvittelen talouspuolta.
'Before I go further, I'll explain the economic aspects'.
Ennen kuin in (75) cannot be used in the meaning 'until'. Furthermore, the fact that (76a) and (76b) express equivalent statements does not necessarily mean that the two connectives are synonymous:
(76) a. Kesri kauan, ennen kuin tapa vakiintui. 'It took a long time before the custom got established.' b. Kesri kauan, kunnen tapa vakiintui.
'It took a long rime until the custom got established'.
Paul Kiparsky (p.c.) observes that in contexts in which ennen kuin is interchangeable with kunnes it can be translated into English as 'until'. However, there do not seem to be any uses of ennen kuin which could not be translated as 'before'. Note that Finnish is not the only language in which 'until' can be exchanged with 'before' in certain contexts. The following English examples of before and until can be considered the counterparts of (76):
(77) a. But it's going to be a long rime before it is over its problems. b. Thus it will take a long rime until the pressure will show results.
Compare also the Dutch examples in (78):
(78) a. De junta weigerde de macht over te dragen voordat er een nieuwe grondwet zou zijn uitgevaardigd. The junta refused to hand over the power before a new constitution had been enacted. b. De junta weigerde de macht over te dragen totdat er een nieuwe grondwet zou zijn uitgevaardigd. The junta refused to hand over the power until a new constitution had been enacted.
I take it that the interpretation of Finnish ennen kuin and Dutch voordat involves existential quantification over times preceding the time referred to by the adverbial, and that they are in this respect similar to English before, whereas kunnes and totdat are interpreted in terms of universal quantification, just like until. The observation that (78a) and (78b) are equivalent is a result of the fact that their temporal clauses attach to different events. Their syntactic structures can be differentiated as in (79): (79) In (79a), handing over the power before the new constitution is enacted is what is refused by the junta. In (79b), the refusal of the handing over of the power lasted until the enactment of the new constitution. The contrast in (76) and (77) is similar. In the a-sentences, the long wait occurred before something else happened, and in the b-sentences, the long wait lasted until that something else happened. Naturally, the combination of a temporal connective meaning 'before' with a wide scope negation allows the interpretation of exclusion on a temporal scale. The interpretation of (80) can be spelled out as in (80a).
(80) Prinsessa ei herannyt ennen kuin yhdeksalta.
a. 3r3r'[Nine(r') A ->3e3f"[Wake-up(princess, e) A AT(e, *") A
t<t"<f]\
Not surprisingly, (80a) is identical to Karttunen's interpretation of negative polarity until in (38c) above. Interestingly, we also observe that an implicature of the event actually happening arises in the Finnish and Dutch examples (80) and (81):
(81) X wilde niets zeggen over de verdeling van de ministersposten voordat de top van de liberale partij en de beoogde coalitiepartners zich ook formed zouden hebben uitgesproken voor het bereikte akkoord.
X did not want to say anything about the distribution of the ministerial posts before the liberal party leadership and the intended coalition partners had declared themselves openly in favor of the agreement.
(81) carries the implicature that X will announce the names of his new ministers as soon as the coalition partners all agree. We observe that the implicature is related to the notion of exclusion as such, and is independent of the way exclusion is expressed. These data weaken Declerck's lexical composition approach, because Finnish ennen kuin and Dutch voordat cannot be considered to form a stereotyped unit with negation. Still, they express the same idea of exclusion on a temporal scale English not... until do, and they trigger the same implicatures. Karttunen's claim that English until in negative contexts is logically equivalent to before is correct in view of the logical equivalence between (33) and (37), or (34) and (38). However, the fact that languages use expressions meaning 'before' in constructions expressing exclusion on a temporal scale is not itself an argument to interpret (certain uses of) English until in terms of existential rather than universal quantification. The cross-linguistic comparison of the expression of exclusion on a temporal scale provides evidence against the lexical composition approach, but it does not allow us to discriminate between the scope analysis and the ambiguity thesis. They give rise to the same truth conditions and implicatures in all contexts discussed until now. This requires us to take a closer look at the possible negative polarity status of until.
Implied duratiuity
One way of providing evidence in favor of a separate use of until as a negative polarity item is to give examples in which until occurs in a non-durative context, which contains some other NPl-licenser than negation. In such contexts, no narrow scope reading for negation can be postulated, and both the lexical composition approach and the scope analysis fail. It has been suggested that evidence in favor of a negative polarity use of until is provided by examples like (82), borrowed from Mittwoch (1988) , where until shows up in the context of a superlative, which is non-durative and non-negative, but a typical licenser for negative polarity items otherwise:
(82) a. This is the biggest city we drive through until we get to San Francisco.
b. This is the last meal you will get until we arrive. c. San Jose is the only stop we will make until we get to San Francisco.
I would like to discard this argument from the start, because I do not think it is convincing. In fact, we observe that until is like^or in the sense that it combines with a slightly larger class than strictly durative sentences, as witnessed by examples like (83) (borrowed from Horn 1970):
(83) a. They closed the bridge until Saturday, b. John left until midnight.
These sentences would not normally be classified as durative. Even so, the combination with until is felicitous. The interpretation we obtain is one of 'implied' durativity. The event described by the sentence entails a state which holds for a certain period of time, and the adverbial phrase measures the duration of the result state, rather than the duration of the event itself. This interpretation is paraphrased in (84): (84) (85) a. We drive through this big city, and we will not drive through any city bigger than this one until we get to San Francisco. b. You will get this meal and you will then be without a meal until we arrive. c. We will stop at San Jose and there will be no other stops until we get to San Francisco.
Given that we need to appeal to implied durativity anyhow in order to explain the well-formedness of sentences like (83), there is no reason why we could not apply that same notion to the examples in (82). If this line of reasoning is correct, the examples in (82) do not provide evidence in favor of a separate use of Mnf/7-phrases as negative polarity items.
Other NPI-licensing contexts
If we cannot use the presence of until in comparative and superlative contexts as an argument in favor of the ambiguity thesis, we have to look at other potential triggers of negative polarity items, such as right monotone decreasing quantifiers (no, almost no, few, etc. In order to get the bound variable interpretation for the pronouns in (86a), we give the quantifier wide scope over the proposition as a whole. This does not rule out the possibility of giving negation narrow scope with respect to until, as (86b) shows. However, this type of approach obscures a more general point, which is that other monotone decreasing quantifiers can trigger this use of until as well, for example:
(87) a. He bought almost nothing until she told him she wanted it. b. He invited few people until he knew she liked them. c. Sporadic protests from local organizations had little effect until June last year when Sheela Barse, a Bombay-based child-rights activist, moved the Goa High Court in Mapusa.
Examples like the ones in (87) are extremely problematic for a unified analysis of HHfi7-phrases as durative aspectual adverbials. Basically, the problem is that we cannot split the NP into a quantifier part and a negation part, where the quantifier would take wide scope over the proposition as a whole, but negation takes narrow scope with respect to the «nn'/-phrase. For the negative universal quantifier in (86) such a lexical decomposition can be defended, but for cases like (87) there is simply no such option.
Other arguments in favor of the negative polarity status of until are its occurrence in the antecedent of conditionals (88a), in rhetorical questions (88b), in the scope of too (88c), and embedded under predicates like doubt (88d), to be afraid (88e), and forbid (88f):
(88) a. I'm damned if I'll hire you until you shave off your beard.
b. Why get married until you absolutely have to? c. They are too cautious to expect real peace and dignity for black men until at least their grandson's era. d. I doubt that Ernie arrived until after midnight. e. Ernie was afraid to leave until his lawyer came. f. He forbade her to leave until the police arrived. Smith (1974) admits that his scope analysis cannot handle examples (88d-f). As Horn (1989: 348) , from whom examples (88a) and (b) are taken, points out, until is only licensed in contexts like these if the sentence carries a strong negative implicature. This is true for (88c) as well. Horn characterizes this conventional usage of conveying a negative content as a short-circuited negative implicature. These examples cannot be explained under the scope analysis, becuse there is no scope bearing operator like negation or a negative quantifier around. Declerck (1995) takes the data in (88) to fit in with his lexical composition approach, because there is a hidden negation in the context, which is necessary for until to be licensed. Although a conventional usage may be an intermediate step towards lexicalization, I have argued that a convention of use does not make it necessary to treat the construction as a frozen idiom. In particular, the literal meaning remains present, and the construction can be given a compositional semantics which builds the meaning of the whole from the meaning of its components. I agree with Horn's conclusion that the data in (87) and (88) motivate a treatment of until as a strict negative polarity item. Roughly the same contexts in which the NPI until shows up trigger the use of expressions like in years (compare de Swart 1995 and Hoeksema 1996) .
CONCLUSION
If we take the examples in (87) and (88) to provide evidence for a separate use of wnfiV-phrases as negative polarity items, we end up adopting an ambiguity thesis, more or less along the lines of Karttunen's (1974) proposal. Although one might have preferred a more conservative approach, this may not be so bad, because the contrast with the scope analysis is not as extreme as it may seem. There are several reasons why this is so. First, we observed that our representation of Karttunen's and Mittwoch's interpretation led to the same truth conditions and the same implicatures for all sentences involving not. .. until. This means that English sentences involving not... until are semantically and pragmatically equivalent to sentences in other languages, which do not have a negative polarity use of 'until'. I have not found examples of German bis and Dutch totdat in non-durative NPI-licensing contexts similar to (87) and (88). This implies that there is no reason to believe that the German and Dutch counterparts to until are negative polarity items, so for these languages the more conservative scope analysis is sufficient. Thanks to the fact that the scope analysis and the ambiguity thesis produce identical results in contexts with an explicit negation, the analysis developed in this paper can explain why English sentences involving not... until, and German/Dutch sentences with erst or pas describe exactly the same temporal structure. The observation that narrow scope of negation with respect to until is equivalent to wide scope of negation with respect to before captures the similarities and differences between the expression of exclusion on a temporal scale in a language like English (which conventionalizes the use of until) and Finnish (which uses before). We can go one step further, and argue that we should let the different analyses exist side by side, because in this way we can explain why Germanic languages like Dutch and German have a scalar particle of exclusion, but also uses the counterparts to until and before to express the exclusion on a temporal scale. In a cross-linguistic perspective, the scope analysis, the ambiguity thesis, and the lexical composition approach each make their own contribution to a better understanding of the expression of exclusion on a temporal scale. 1 Vendler treats aspect as a properly of predicates. Since Verkuyl (1972) pointed out that both the object and the subject NP have a decisive influence on the aspectual character, it has become generally accepted that we should talk about the aspectual class of sentences instead. 2 How soon after the time referred to by the until adverbial the event is expected to take place depends on the context. As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, the utterance of (5) implies that we do not expect the princess to remain awake until nine thirty. However, in the context of (i), a period of time is allowed to go by before the wedding:
(i) John did not get married until his mother died.
People do not usually get married shortly after a closer relative died, so a certain delay is expected in (i). This suggests that what counts as 'shortly after' is determined by pragmatic considerations. I will not provide more precise constraints on the distance between the time referred to by the M/iti7-clause and the actualization of the event. 3 Further evidence for the inference of actualization as an implicature rather than an assertion is given in section $.2 below. 4 The # indicates that only a non-intended reading is available. In (12c), we can imagine Eve drawing a circle over and over again for three hours. Similarly, (12a) is acceptable if we give the predicate an inchoative reading and interpret love as 'start to love'. Such readings require a more flexible approach to aspect, which allows sentences to switch from one aspectual class to another. Such mappings are discussed by Moens (1988) , who labels them 'coercion'. 5 As an anonymous reviewer points out, the sentence is acceptable on the reading which allows a continuation of the form '... but in other years, she didn't love him at all'. This is not the aspectual use of in I am interested in here. 6 The view that negative sentences as a whole introduce a state into the discourse has important consequences for the analysis of negative sentences in narrative discourse, as shown by de Swart and Molendijk (1994) . 7 In the case of states like to be in the garden, the situation must hold at all instants t" of the interval from t till t. In the case ot activities like to sleep, quantification will be over all subintervals t down to a minimal size. Compare Dowry (1979: 333) and others for discussion of the minimal parts problem in the interpretation of activities. 8 Compare Kamp & Reyle (1993: 647) for similar remarks on/>r-adverbials. 9 For the sake of transparency of the formulas, I will usually leave out the conjunct which specifies the temporal location of the situation with respect to the speech time. This information is irrelevant for the comparison of the different approaches to not. . . until. 10 Because Karttunen (1974) is only interested in punctual until meaning 'before', I limit myself to a definition of before for event predicates. For a more detailed discussion of the relation between aspectual properties of the sentence and the interpretation of temporal connectives, see de Swart (1991). 11 There is an extensive literature on the interpretation of only, and the division of labor between presupposition and assertarions, which I will not review here, because it falls outside the scope of this paper. Recent discussions of these issues can be found in Atlas (1993) and Horn (1996) . 12 The definition given here is for event predicates in the temporal clause. The definition for state predicates runs exactly parallel. The main clause always involves a state, as usual. 13 In order to keep the formulas readable, I
simplify the representation slightly, and leave out the quantification over (different) jobs. 14 As an anonymous reviewer points out, 
